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The Preventive and Anticipatory Dimension 




Abstract: The right to self-defense of states, as well as any other right, has to be regulated in order to 
be applicable and to have the consequences of a right. Known over time in terms of value and principle 
of national self-determination, the right to self-defense of states was necessary, especially after World 
War II, to become an international norm established by common consensus between the signatories 
parties of the UN Charter. In addition to the internal regulations that may exist in the fundamental or 
special laws of the States, this international regulation comes to establish the general guidelines that 
governments must note in taking action in cases that entail the self-defense of a state. An important 
aspect of this right to self-defense is that of its preventive and anticipatory dimension, which some 
states invoke for their own interest. 
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The dynamics of international relations require states to take all necessary 
measures to survive. Over time, the armed conflict has played an important 
role in redefining and reshaping the relations between states. Protective 
measures are part of the means by which a state ensures its existence. 
Protective measures include a wide range of actions or inactions, from 
preventive and diplomatic, to attack and coercive. Any attack and defense 
measures are governed by international law, even if some are interpretable 
and incomplete. With the completion of the Cold War, the multipolarity 
power centers has led to the reorganization of the international system. More 
and more actors want to have the ability to emancipate and impose their 
interactions, often invoking the need for self-defense. And this need 
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embodied in a right can often be considered too discretionary, so that the right 
to self-defense is interpreted lato sensu. 
In this article, I would like to examine from a legal point of view the right to 
self-defense of states, with particular emphasis on the anticipatory or 
preventive aspects of self-defense. Mainly established in the intervention in 
Iraq, this anticipation or prevention of the self-defense can be categorized as 
a far too wide interpretation, which is why its legitimacy is questioned. In 
order to analyze in concrete terms the way in which a state can invoke 
preventive or anticipatory self-defense measures, I will take into 
consideration the case of North Korea in this article, where I want to analyze 
to what extent continuous and complex arming can be based on a preventive 
and anticipatory right to self-defense. For a better understanding of the theme, 
I chose to structure the work in four parts. In the first part I will present the 
general aspects of the right to self-defense, followed by the legitimacy 
conferred by Article 51 of the UN Charter. The third part of the paper deals 
with aspects of anticipatory and preventive character, which will allow me to 
further analyze the case of North Korea. The assumption from which I start 
is that the right to self-defense also requires a “not to do” obligation. The main 
objective is to demonstrate whether anticipatory and preventive self-defense 
measures can also be active (attack), or only passive (arming) in order to be 
grounded on Article 51 of the UN Charter. The second objective is to 
determine to what extent the North Korean state's arming can ever be 
grounded on such a right. 
 
1. General Aspects 
Seen as a right against military action of a state, this right leaves room for 
interpretations and can sometimes be ignored or interpreted far too widely by 
states to benefit the presumption of innocence and good faith. Aspects under 
the UN Charter on States’ Self-Defense Right are completed by decisions and 
resolutions of UN bodies that clarify the limits of interpretations of this right, 
but also bring in void in its application. Even if its applicability in the current 
international context is temporally, materially or geographically restricted, 
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the fact that there are “hot areas” that are about to break into new armed 
conflicts, determines that this right is taken into account by involved parties. 
The right to self-defense has been used in the past in armed conflicts as a 
reason to trigger, carry or end a war, being established as bilateral conventions 
or quasi-known general principles. For most of the period, these principles 
were part of the right of war between states or medieval entities, characterized 
by the doctrine of bellum justum (Sloane, 2013, pp. 57-59), but which lost its 
importance because it was far too objective. Subsequently, other principles 
were developed that laid the foundations and generally governed how war can 
be triggered, unfolded or ended. They have redefined the rules on war law, 
setting criteria to follow, in order to combat the disproportionality or unfair 
cause. Thus, the jus ad bellum principle has in mind the following aspects: 
there is (i) a just cause, (ii) a right intention, (iii) supervised and approved by 
a legitimate authority, there is (iv) a formal declaration of war, (v) exhausted 
all other peaceful solutions, there must be (vi) proportionality between 
purposes and forces, and it must not be (vii) a reasonable expectation of defeat 
or victory (Parcero, 2001, pp. 282-283). 
The jus in bello principle establishes new criteria on the principle of non-
discrimination or immunity (which would also represent the declared states 
of neutrality) and, in particular, restates the issues of proportionality. These 
principles refer to a limited concept of war, contrary to the idea of total 
warfare. Among these principles, as part of jus ad bellum and jus bello, they 
distinguish between aggression theory and isolation theory. The first contains 
those principles by which it intends to apply the subject of action only to go 
to war, from a moral point of view, the source being armed violence or 
aggression. The second is to avoid unnecessary suffering, and the principles 
of this theory attempt to regulate and limit the actions of a war that has been 
launched, and must include at least proportionality and non-discrimination 
(Parcero, 2001, p. 284). This comparison is important because it distinguishes 
with the simple action (decision) of war and quality (good or bad) to qualify 
military actions. Even though these are war criteria, they have a particular 
importance in terms of the right to self-defense, in relation to the rules of war. 
Thus, by qualifying the legal limits of a state's military action, the right to 
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self-defense of the aggrieved state is in some form, stable. In addition, they 
later led to the evolution of these principles, gradually establishing the 
normative criteria for the right of self-defense. 
Following these principles, it was possible for the League of Nations to 
establish and supervise the right to war and conflict between states (Stahn & 
Kleffner, 2008, pp. 11-12). In accordance with Article 12 of the Convention 
of League of Nations, there were four special situations: (i) a war or conflict 
started without a mediation or prior arbitration; (ii) before the end of the three-
month period following the completion of mediation or arbitration, (iii) 
attacking a non-aggressive member of the League of Nations Council, or (iv) 
against a non-member League (Sobel, 1994, pp. 175-177). 
Moreover, the General Treaty for the Waiver of War (also known as the 
Kellog-Briand Covenant or the Paris Pact, 1928) stipulated and normalized 
the possibility of resorting to war for any international controversy so as to 
give up war as a state policy. This principle is also found in Article 2 of the 
Charter of the United Nations. The concept of jus ad bellum is closely linked 
to the state’s right to self-defense, as the latter was seen as a response to the 
incitement of a war. With time passing and the adoption of new international 
regulations, the right to self-defense has become a principle of its own, in that 
it was not just a matter of war, but it has become a basis for relations between 
states. Following this idea, I will examine the issues covered by the UN 
Charter in Article 51 on the right to self-defense, its limits and conditions in 
its application, but also the additions made by the resolutions of the UN 
General Assembly or the Security Council. 
 
2. Article 51 UN Charter 
The Second World War also brought the need to regulate in the international 
law principles regarding the launching and carrying on of a war. Thus, until 
then the rules were limited, but since the adoption of the UN Charter, they’ve 
become restrictive. The principle of the right to self-defense is no longer seen 
as an element of war, but of peace. States undertake not only to ensure the 
proper conduct of a war and the right to challenge it legitimately, but to oblige 
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states to protect the right of states to self-defense. This is basically regulated 
in the UN Charter, in Article 51, as a basis for the right to self-defense of 
states, sustained and criticized, both because of its necessity and its vague 
character. The right to self-defense of states also entails the principle of 
responsibility. This principle takes into account the conduct of states on the 
international stage and in relation to other states, which establishes 
obligations of states under international rules (Gonzales, 2010, pp. 13-14). In 
this way, the right to self-defense of states is protected by the conduct of states 
which, under the pressure of regulating the rules of behavior towards other 
states or in international relations, are compelled to behave to protect their 
general interests, implicitly to obtain the protection of their own interests. 
But this force, which the right to self-defense has gained, is in contrast to the 
aggression, a relationship that can be established as two sides of the same 
coin, and the difference between the two would be represented by the 
functions and purpose of the two. Aggression is to cause a body of the United 
Nations to take action and ultimately to determine responsibility, and the right 
to self-defense is such as to enable a state to take appropriate action against 
unlawful acts committed without the approval of superior / international 
bodies (Bowett, 1960, p. 199). However, the use of force by either a State or 
an international organization is only possible with a significant limitation. 
This refers to a self-defense case that is not identical to self-help, being rather 
a “special case of self-help”. It is self-help against the illegal use of force, not 
against other violations of the law. Self-defense is the use of force by a state 
illegally attacked by another. The attack against the use of force as an act of 
self-defense is permissible but must have been or must be forcible (Kelsen, 
1948, pp. 784-795). The right to self-defense is at least a self-help which, even 
within a system of collective security forces based on a centralized 
community monopoly, must be allowed. As such, it is recognized by national 
law, as well as by international law, within the State and within the 
international community. 
Between the moment when the unlawful attacks begin and the moment when 
the centralized collective security mechanism is put into action, there is, even 
if the prompt operation is perfect, a space, an interval that can be disastrous 
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for the victim. In a collective security system organized on the basis of a 
complete centralization of the legitimate use of the self-defense force, is the 
case where the central body takes a penalty against the illegal use of force 
(Kelsen, 1948, pp. 784-795). The case in which the attack takes place on a 
member who, until the central body’s response, suffers until the decision to 
counteract or issue provisions on how to defend or resolve the armed 
intervention. The right to self-defense, although conclusive in the case to 
collective security communities, has a natural loophole, so the subject matter 
of the attack without subjectively attributing that right runs the risk of 
remaining in conflict until the decision of the supreme bodies. However, the 
Charter of the Nations United, regulates a collective security system with a 
Security Council to decide on the issues of this kind, being the only one who 
has the ability to decide in the armed interventions or the answers to the given 
challenges. However, the question remains to what extent are states, subject 
to armed attacks by others, willing to wait for the Security Council's decision 
or to respond to the challenge of its own initiative? It is worth mentioning in 
this case that of the US military interventions, the North Atlantic Alliance and 
allies in Afghanistan and Iraq. If for the first case the approval of the Security 
Council came in favor, in the second case there was a negative answer. But 
the United States continued its efforts towards Iraq, building on both self-
defense, preventive and collective, without taking into account the resolution 
of the Security Council. Thus, the right to self-defense can also be used for 
aggression, but only by highly developed states with military capabilities. 
The dilemma of the right to self-defense in a security community is whether 
this right rests upon a state as a member of that community and becomes a 
matter of principle and charismatics of the community, or becomes by the fact 
that this right is an assignment and a prerogative of each state to maintain its 
independence and intergeneration? In a world that carries on interdependence, 
both individually and collectively, the necessary measures must be taken, 
proportionate whenever necessary to eliminate international threats to peace 
and security, and implicitly to protect its members. This interdependence 
creates the optimal solution so that, in order to protect its own interests, the 
state, member of an international community, must take care to protect them 
collectively. However, in order to preserve the security of their interests, the 
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collectivity is obliged to resort to the protection of the constituent elements. 
In this case, the right to self-defense is reciprocal, since personal security is 
collective security, and vice versa (Alexandrov, 1996, pp. 29-34). 
The United Nations Charter establishes the legal framework for States' 
conduct on the international scene, with each other or with other 
organizations. The right to self-defense of states is specified in Article 51 of 
the Charter, adopted on 26 June 1946 in San Francisco. Article 51 therefore 
sets out the basic rules on self-defense. However, it can not be denied that the 
right to self-defense is, at least to a certain extent, an international customary 
law. Crucial and universally accepted are the legal criteria that appear in the 
international convention but are not all provided in Article 51, especially the 
requirements of necessity and proportionality. For the present, however, it is 
simply necessary to take into account that self-defense derives from two 
different “sources” (Green: 2009, p. 9). UN members introduced Article 51 
of the Charter not for the purpose of defining the individual right to self-
defense of states but for the purpose of clarifying the situation with regard to 
collective self-defense arrangements (Kunz, 1947, pp. 872-873). The right to 
self-defense is still in domestic and international law, clearly distinct from the 
so-called “state of necessity”. The right to self-defense is a complete 
justification, it is a right, not just an excuse. But this is a right, established by 
positive law. As in domestic law, self-defense under art. 51 is not a law 
enforcement procedure, it is not designed to punish the aggressor, it is not a 
sanction of the United Nations, but serves primarily to reject an illegal armed 
attack. 
UN members have developed Article 51 to clarify this issue, especially in 
terms of defense against foreign aggression, so it was natural for the article to 
be linked to collective defense against an armed attack. The delegations 
initially considered that Article 51 would limit the right to collective self-
defense of regional organizations and would require the prior approval of the 
UN Security Council to exercise its right to self-defense (den Hole, 2002, p. 
77). In the debate that followed, the delegates clearly opted for the customary 
right of self-defense to be unaltered and, in particular, to prevent a single 
permanent member of the UN Security Council from being able to stop a 
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regional organization take any measures, using his right of veto (Kunz, 1947, 
p. 874). 
As a result, delegates have placed in Article 51 that “the use of the weapon in 
legitimate defense remains admissible and intact.” The only exceptions set 
out in Articles 42 and 51 of the UN Charter, in connection with measures 
taken by the Security Council and the right to self-defense, it is the fact that 
neither of these two elements would be in connection with the provisions of 
an international treaty providing a guarantee of a violation of the use of force. 
On the other hand, it was underlined that, even from the entry into force, 
compliance with existing standards in international law and, in particular, 
with the Charter of the United Nations, it always depends on the 
circumstances and purposes for which the actors are engaged. It has been 
undisputed that even the Charter conditions the legitimate use of force in 
certain circumstances, pursuant to Article 51. (den Hole, 2002, p. 78) 
Article 51 of the UN Charter clearly recognizes “the right inherent to 
individual or collective self-defense in the event of an armed attack against a 
member of the United Nations” by anyone. The content of Article 51 does not 
identify or prescribe the type of aggressor or aggressors against whom this 
right to self-defense can be exercised (Hertz, 2010, pp. 1-2) and certainly does 
not limit the right to self-defense against attacks. It remains to be investigated 
to what extent Article 51 can be applied to attacks from non-state entities that 
may result in the application of this regulation. For example, terrorist groups 
located on the territory of a state, which endanger the safety and security of 
another state. This can be easily exemplified by the position of the United 
States of America, which grounded their action in the Afghan War on one of 
these principles. Thus, the actions of the Al Qaeda terrorist group have been 
minimized as a result of US intervention in Afghanistan. This operation was 
also based on some of the provisions of Article 51 for the US self-defense 
right following 9/11 terrorist actions protected from non-UN entities or states 
but taking action against its members United Nations. 
So the starting point can be found in Article 51 of the UN Charter, in 
conjunction with Article 2 (4), although it is important to recognize that all 
conditions and requirements for exercise are vague. While Article 2 (4) 
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prohibits “the threat or use of force”, Article 51 provides for an "armed 
attack” and not a threat of attack, giving rise to tendentious interpretations of 
this concept (Rodriguez, 2005, pp. 277-278). Moreover, the way in which the 
Charter was drafted in 1945 falls into a historical context in which the concept 
of “armed attack” be conceived apart from the regular armed forces of a state 
confronted with the army of another state. The right to self-defense is 
associated with two schools of thought: the first is the one who considers the 
state has the first instinct to preserve and maintain its integrity, and in order 
to achieve this, it is necessary to preserve its interests, security and safety. 
The struggle against a nation must be countered, and this is not just a right 
but an obligation, although its status is international, that of a right and not an 
obligation (Rodriguez, 2005, pp. 277-278). But the major problem with the 
right of self-defense is that there is no consensus on which the rights or 
interests of the state can be protected by self-defense. 
The second school of thought advances the idea that the right can not 
legitimize self-defense, because the power of a state is superior when it comes 
to state protection. In this case, each state must choose which measures are 
necessary to protect its interests and self-defense. It divides states into two 
categories: those who have a broad view of the right to self-defense, such as 
the case of the United States of America, and those who have a restrictive 
vision such as France (Anand, 2009, p. 30). Thus, US intervention in Panama 
in 1989 was justified by the need to protect the interests of American citizens 
in the area, rather than claiming the true reason for restoring democracy in the 
area. 
The right to self-defense is a controversial issue because its exercise is 
paradoxical and can undermine or combat the very purpose of the 
international mechanism of protecting order of international relations. The 
right to self-defense, as it is regulated and codified in the UN Charter, is of 
major importance for ensuring the integrity and independence of states when 
collective security measures fail. In an anarchic and decentralized 
international system, there will inevitably be circumstances in which states 
will have to secure protection when legal action fails. Since it is difficult to 
create a legal system that does not contain exceptions to the use of force in 
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the form of the right to self-defense, they should be closely supervised by an 
organization to determine more carefully the discriminatory or non-
discriminatory way of using this right. The right to self-defense tends to be 
transformed into a way of exerting violence, and in the form of regulations 
designed to prevent the use of aggression, they can be turned into aggressive 
actions (Anand, 2009, pp. 25-28). 
The application of the conditions that must be met to attract the incidence of 
the provisions of Article 51 can not be left to the discretion of States which 
can claim their own interpretations and applications. Thus, if analyzed in a 
restrictive way, they tend to omit unforeseen situations, and thus states or 
other entities can find resources to avoid the application of the provisions of 
Article 51. If they are interpreted too broadly, one can create an advantage for 
some parties. In order to determine the right to self-defense, States may also 
take into account or should also take into account regulatory issues provided 
by international bodies or the provisions of bilateral or multilateral 
agreements. One of the regulations that may arise in invoking the right to self-
defense is the resolutions provided by the UN Security Council or the General 
Assembly. The regulation of the right to self-defense has led to its being 
subjected to an analysis by the International Court of Justice as a superior 
forum for interpretation and judgment in cases where the conditions 
established and imposed by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations 
are breached. One of the main issues concerning the right to self-defense, 
which has generated interpretations both at the level of states and 
international bodies, is the invocation of the preventive and anticipatory 
nature that it may have. 
 
3. Preventive/Anticipatory right to Self-Defense 
One of the most important aspects of the right to self-defense of states has 
recently been linked to the possibility, legitimacy and ability of states to take 
anticipatory or preventive measures of self-defense. These issues come about 
as a result of the need and wishes of states to ensure as effectively as possible 
the possible threats to them by invoking anticipatory or preventive measures 
of the right to self-defense. To begin with, I want to establish that there is a 
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difference between anticipatory measures and preventative self-defense 
measures. 
Claiming preventive self-defense is a possibility to use unilaterally, without 
prior international authorization, a high level of violence to counteract a 
potentially threatening development at an early stage that is not yet 
operational or a direct danger, but if it is allowed to mature, could be seen by 
potential danger with unacceptable consequences for that part. Preventive 
self-defense law differs from the anticipatory measures to self-defense in the 
sense that the latter may indicate a palpable and imminent threat. Thus, the 
right of self-defense (which was not contemplated by the authors of the UN 
Charter, though supported by many in later practice) is at least similar to the 
armed attack requirement in the Article 51 Charter, as it could be tangible 
evidence of an imminent attack. A request for self-defense preventive 
measure may only be a possibility among a number of other possibilities or 
may be an emergency. The threshold of preventive self-defense is 
interpretative, unilaterally attributed, therefore, the nature and amount of 
evidence that can satisfy the burden of proof being unilateral, being difficult 
to define, rather extrapolate and speculative (Reisman, 2006, pp. 525- 526). 
The major difference between preventive and anticipatory measures is the 
imminence of the danger, but in my view both raises the same signs of 
legitimacy in relation to the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter. Such 
preventive measures are to halt a possible attack, which is not even outlined, 
and the anticipatory measures are those that prevent an attack whose chances 
are greatest. However, the similarity between the two is the fact that in none 
of the cases the attack took place, so the conditions of Article 51 on the right 
to self-defense are not fully met. It is of interest for the present paper to find 
out under what conditions the measures to stop the attack, whether preventive 
or anticipatory, can be invoked on Article 51. Therefore, in the the paper I 
will refer both to preventive measures and to those anticipated on the 
incidence of the right to self-defense. 
The preventive or anticipatory right to self-defense, represented by the 
adoption of measures, so that there is no surprise to an attack, is not provided 
by international regulations. Article 51 of the UN Charter, as mentioned 
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above, refers to the adoption of self-defense measures only after an armed 
attack has taken place. However, these measures are not new, but have been 
practiced over time by states, in stabilizing situations that can become 
dangerous. Thus, we can equally comment that the US attitude towards the 
Nicaraguan conflict is not just about the right to collective self-defense, but 
also a preventive and anticipatory one that there is no fear that this situation 
in Nicaragua, may worsen, and thus harm the interests of the United States of 
America. 
In this way, one can easily ask the question: To what extent can the self-
defense preventive/anticipative measures be based on the provisions of 
Article 51 of the UN Charter? Although there is the case of Caroline, the 
jurists of the UN Charter, they seem to have wanted to omit the regulation of 
this right, and that is simply because they can be neglected. If, under Article 
51, abuse can be made, then certainly a regulation on preventive/anticipatory 
self-defense would create chaos, as each State could adopt measures against 
another (s) on their own conviction, that measures are being prepared to 
destabilize or jeopardize the comfort of that state. 
In this respect, over time, states have adopted measures that were 
preventive/anticipatory in self-defense, especially since the entire Cold War 
period was based on such a conviction. In this regard, the states have adopted 
regulated measures (National Security Strategy for a New Century, USA, 
1998), which from the point of view of the domestic law constitute the legal 
basis to act in the application of the preventive/anticipatory right to self-
defense. In 2000, however, the Clinton administration issued a new security 
document (National Security Strategy for a Global Age, USA, 2000), in 
which the focus was more explicit on terrorism. Concerning possible nuclear 
attacks from an asymmetric opponent, being a strategic reaction, preventive 
or anticipatory action being considered as a means of combating asymmetric 
enemies using terrorist techniques. If these measures are implemented, 
wishing to eliminate the dangers without there being an armed attack that 
would draw the foundation on the basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter, but 
only the principles regarding the right to self-defense and 
preventive/anticipative measures, in this case , who would be obliged to prove 
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the evidence? In a brief analysis, it would surely be established that the person 
making the allegation, as in the case of Article 51, is to prove the actions of 
the other/others in order to legitimize his actions. 
Another point that should be highlighted is that if the State invoking the right 
to self-defense and preventive/anticipatory measures use these to annihilate 
the possibilities of dangers, even if they have not occurred, the attacking State 
may invoke the right to self-defense on the basis of the foundations laid down 
in Article 51. The legitimacy of this principle of preventive/anticipatory self-
defense, although it seems a little forced, is not fantastic in the relationship 
between states. These may behave differently and surprisingly to other states, 
and with military equipment in the times of today, such an important aspect 
can not be neglected. States, in order to maintain their integrity, must use 
different means to suppress any possible threat to them. But it is dangerous 
an event that has not happened, but there is a belief that it would happen in 
order to be eliminated from the start? Can Article 51 be interpreted strictly so 
that the steps can not be taken until the attack has been established? If we are 
referring to respect for international law, then the answer would be no. 
However, the right of legitimate defense as well as in criminal law must be 
ensured. In this case, as in the case of other types of attacks (made in the case 
of individuals or those created as rights of defense), certain conditions in this 
respect should be established. There is no recognition of this right in itself, 
but there is an acknowledgment of the dangers that may arise and which if the 
possibility should be avoided. 
One of the most important cases of anticipatory and even preventive measures 
is that of measures taken by the United States after the attacks of 9/11. 
Measures have been adopted to re-address the terrorism. Thus, the adoption 
of strategies on the right to self-defense, considering the perturbation and 
destruction of terrorist organizations even through preventive measures 
(National Security Strategy of the United Sates, 2002) as well as in the 
National Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, issued in 
December 2002 (National Strategy to combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
USA, 2002) 
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The war in Iraq was one of the cases where the right to self-defense 
preventive/anticipatory measures was invoked. The initiators of the military 
interventions were grounded in the fact that the Iraqi state would hold 
weapons of mass destruction that would represent a future potential threat to 
regional or international security. The war in Iraq has had several announced 
objectives, including the implementation of UN resolutions and international 
law, as well as helping the people of Iraq, partly by eliminating Saddam 
Hussein and introducing democracy. It has also been agreed that one of the 
main declared objectives of the war in Iraq was to prevent or reduce the 
terrorist attacks in the future by the United States and its allies, and also to 
prevent weapons of mass destruction (Sinnott- Armstrong, 2007). However, 
these measures have remained unconstitutional at both national and 
international level. 
Also, Franklin Eric Wester establishes the ethical criteria that have the right 
to start a rebellious war and the right to self-defense. Thus, first of all, (i) the 
legitimate authority that such a measure must have, (ii) the public declaration 
of war, (iii) the intention and determination, (iv) the proportionality, v) to 
represent the last measure and (vi) a reasonable hope of success. I consider 
whether the conditions for the legitimacy of anticipatory or preventive self-
defense measures are met, should be taken into account if they take the active 
form of an intervention or remain in passive, armed rather than attacking 
form. If they remain passive, the provisions of the right to self-defense are 
met and respect the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter. The discussion 
is in the context in which the anticipatory or preventive measures take the 
active form of aggression. In this sense, I believe that they are implicitly a 
right to self-defense only on condition that they meet the criteria of the just 
war listed above. 
 
4. North Korea’s Problem 
As we have shown in our work, the right to self-defense, anticipatory and 
preventive measures are mechanisms that states tend to use not only to defend 
themselves but also to strengthen their regional and global position vis-à-vis 
other states or entities that can address the dangers to its own security. 
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Preventive and anticipatory measures to remove possible threats are 
increasingly used by states in the context of military capabilities and threats 
on the international scene. The case of the United States as an “international 
guardian” of security and stability is not easily overlooked by other states that 
do not always share US doctrine and who want or claim the need of invoking 
anticipatory and preventive self-defense measures. 
North Korea is one of the problem states but, like any other state, its 
sovereignty gives it the right to take the necessary steps to defend itself. Thus, 
over the course of decades, North Korea has resorted to arming to prepare for 
possible attacks against it. The Korean War has left room for interpretations 
and mutual claims between the two Korean states are leading a bilateral 
position. Looking at the historical and political context of the division of the 
Korean state, is North Korea able to claim the same rights as South Korea? 
Being two states with a common root and a common purpose, to reunite the 
state of Korea but also in relation to the sovereign character of the state, each 
of the two may have similar claims. 
Thus, by analyzing in an objective manner without taking into account the 
regimes governing the two states, from an international point of view, they 
are equal in terms of independence, sovereignty and different evolution. If, in 
this context, some states support the cause of South Korea, it is justifiable for 
his communist brother to take the necessary steps to ensure his existence. 
Moreover, the right to self-defense is also an obligation of the state towards 
its components (population, territory, etc.) and North Korea is no exception 
just because it chooses to pursue another state policy. Regarding this case, 
where North Korea resorts to an isolationist policy with very little support 
from the international community, it must, from its point of view, resort to 
violation of international norms. This only creates the same sense of necessity 
of invoking the preventive and anticipatory measures of self-defense of the 
other states. This is a poor race in which everyone has the right to defend 
themselves.  
The lack of balance of forces, North Korea versus the international 
community inevitably raises the question of the extent to which North Korea 
is legitimate to violate the rules imposed by the adversary? From the folklore 
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of other interventions, the use of force, and the invocation of the right to self-
defense, and in particular the Bush doctrine, on the preventive attack, we can 
see that the North Korean state abuses to some extent the use of the right to 
self-defense. Nuclear arming is the main reason why there would be an action 
based on the right to self-defense on or by North Korea. Here is the question 
of both sides, North Korea or the international community must invoke 
preventive or anticipatory measures of self-defense(?) Let’s first see how 
much the US and its allies can resort to anticipatory or preventive self-defense 
measures. To begin with, the main concern for the US and its allies is North 
Korea’s nuclear arsenal. Is nuclear facilities and the development of such a 
weapon a reason to attract such interventions? Is it illegal to develop nuclear 
capabilities? In such a situation, the International Court of Justice has also 
ruled, stating a slightly interpretable position. 
The opinion on the lawfulness of the threat or use of nuclear weapons was 
pronounced on 8 July 1996 following a request made by the UN General 
Assembly in December 1994. The General Assembly asked the IJC to issue 
an advisory opinion on the question is it the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
in any situation permitted by international law? A number of States have 
made observations, both in writing and orally, before the Court's deliberations 
on the question. I Court issued an opinion on this issue, after examining a 
number of areas of international law in the context of nuclear weapons. 
Following a discussion on human rights, the ban on genocide and 
international environmental law The Court found that “the relevant applicable 
law regulates the problem is the one on the use of force and the law applicable 
to armed conflict governing the conduct of hostilities” together with any 
specific treaties on nuclear weapons (Hefferman, 1998, pp. 134-135). 
With regard to the ban on the threat or use of force, the Court found that 
neither Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations nor customary 
international law expressly prohibits the use of nuclear weapons but that the 
threat or use of nuclear weapons constitute an infringement of Article 2(4). 
However, the Court has also applied the right to self-defense in this context. 
It concluded that the threat or use of nuclear weapons could become legal 
action in self-defense. However, the Court has stated that this would only be 
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the case if such a threat or the use of nuclear weapons meet the criteria 
relevant to any self-defense. A threat or use of force should also be compatible 
with international requirements on the law applicable to armed conflicts, in 
particular those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, 
as well as specific obligations under the Treaties and other undertakings 
dealing with express way with nuclear weapons (ICJ, 1996, pp. 96-98). Thus, 
it was concluded that the threat or use of nuclear weapons “would generally 
be contrary to international law”, but the Court does not rule out the 
possibility that such threats or use may be lawful in extreme circumstances. 
Since there is currently no resolution of the Security Council authorizing the 
use of force in response to North Korea’s nuclear status, and any military 
action against North Korea should be justified as an act of self-defense in 
international customary law or the Charter UN (Sabel, 2012, pp. 2-3). There 
are three reasoning that the United States or other states could use the self-
defense principle to justify the use of preventive or anticipatory force against 
North Korea. First, the attempt to develop or acquire additional weapons of 
mass destruction that could disrupt the nuclear balance in northeast Asia, thus 
constituting an “imminent threat” to international security. 
Secondly, North Korea’s actions could be an imminent threat, as North Korea 
could sell arms to terrorist organizations. Finally, threats or use of force may 
be necessary to ensure North Korea’s compliance with its obligations. These 
justifications for anticipatory/preventive measures do not meet internationally 
acceptable self-defense reasons. First, they do not meet the standards of 
necessity and proportionality established in accordance with the Caroline 
Doctrine and customary international law. Secondly, it would be 
inappropriate to consider even military action in the case of North Korea, 
given the requirement for states to exhaust all peaceful ways of recourse 
before resorting to the use of force, a principle that was confirmed by the 
collective security structure established in the UN Charter. The third is that 
the use of force in self-defense was limited in accordance with Article 51 to 
respond to an “armed attack”, “which, by definition, would not allow 
preventive or anticipatory measures against North Korea or its alleged nuclear 
development” (Alexandrov, 1996, pp. 96-102). 
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Under customary international law, any preventive attack by the United States 
against alleged nuclear installations in North Korea should meet the necessity 
and proportionality requirements set forth in the Caroline Doctrine. A 
preventive attack would not be justified solely by North Korea's possession 
of nuclear weapons or violations of arms control agreements due to lack of 
necessity. One of the main difficulties in implementing preventive doctrine 
lies in satisfying the requirement that North Korea acts as an imminent threat 
to US security. As established in the Caroline Doctrine, the need for self-
defense must be “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of middle, and no 
time for deliberation” (Donaldson, 2013, pp. 538-539). 
The sale of nuclear weapons to terrorists is a possibility, especially following 
the events of 11 September 2001. Despite these reasonable concerns, simple 
speculation that North Korea could offer weapons of mass destruction to 
terrorist organizations does not justify the use of force under international 
law. There is currently no established connection between North Korea and 
A-Qaeda or any other terrorist organization. Moreover, the use of preventive 
force in North Korea in response to breaches of arms control agreements 
would not be justified by lack of necessity (Maloney, pp. 882-885). Violations 
of arms control agreements are of international interest, however, this 
behavior is actually fairly common among states. In fact, North Korea has 
consistently accused the United States of violating its commitments in the 
debates. The same criteria can be formulated against North Korea, unlawful 
to invoke preventive and anticipatory self-defense measures to the detriment 
of the US and its allies. Unlike the case of Iraq, where the US could invoke 
preventive self-defense measures by invoking the involvement of the Iraqi 
state in terrorist affairs, North Korean isolation does not justify such 
measures, which may take the form of a right to self-defense. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Since ancient times the right to self-defense has been one that has led to the 
evolution of international relations and, implicitly, to international public law. 
Whether it is a natural right, in which states as well as men seek to protect 
their existence and interests, or their obligation to take all necessary measures 
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to survive, the right to self-defense, has become from a reserved principle the 
law of war, a source of the way in which it is triggered, unfolded or ended. 
With time passing, the right to self-defense has evolved since the 
determination of the just or unjust character of a war in the ancient period, 
continuing with principles of proportionality to the situation when, after the 
adoption of the UN Charter, it is regulated as a possibility of protection, and 
one of the only reasons why armed violence can be exercised. The right to 
self-defense is a controversial issue because its exercise is paradoxical and 
can undermine or combat the very purpose of the international mechanism of 
protecting order on the stage of international relations. The right to self-
defense, as it is regulated and codified in the UN Charter, is of major 
importance for ensuring the integrity and independence of states when 
collective security measures fail. In an anarchic and decentralized 
international system, there will inevitably be circumstances in which states 
will have to secure protection when legal action fails. 
The key issue is to delimitate cases where the right to self-defense can be 
invoked so that it does not become a way for states to trigger actions to divert 
attention from their true intent. The evolution of the right to self-defense is 
important for the current collective security system, because without it, the 
anarchic system of today would trigger chaotic initiatives. As a matter of 
strategic practice, any attacking state is likely to make an enormous effort to 
demonstrate the culpability of its opponent, limited only by inhibitions in 
terms of the operational effect of information sharing methods. As a matter 
of law, however, there is no requirement for a state to receive the blessing of 
the Security Council before responding to an armed attack. 
The right to self-defense, as well as any other right, may be subject to unusual 
circumstances, testing its applicability, legitimacy, and especially the 
possibility of filling new cases appearing on the international scene. From the 
application of the conditions laid down in the custom and regulations to the 
interpretations given by the International Court of Justice, which are fully 
supported by a body such as the UN General Assembly or the Security 
Council, the right to self-defense is one of the most important rights may have 
a state. Although global actors, capable of playing a role as important as 
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states, a state’s own defense, appear as a right, but also an obligation to its 
own elements, but also to the collective the security it is part of. 
Another dilemma that arises is the difficulty in assessing proportionality, 
making it difficult to speculate on the appropriateness of the potential for 
action, particularly in view of the uncertainty of the threat to US security. 
Although not quoted as often as other aspects of the Caroline doctrine, the 
exhaustion of peaceful remedies is an important principle in international law, 
which was reinforced by Article 51 of the UN Charter, which provides for 
self-defense in the event of an “armed attack”. 
This standard has not been met with regard to the Korean nuclear crisis, given 
the US's refusal to engage until now in any talks with North Korea until it 
meets certain conditions. In addition, preventive and anticipatory force use is 
not justified under the UN Charter’s self-defense requirement if an armed 
attack did not take place, nor does such an attack appear to be planned. The 
possession or sale of nuclear weapons and violations of the Non-proliferation 
Treaty obligations are not suitable areas for unilateral military action. If the 
United States has asserted and exercised the expansive right of self-defense 
based on its individual determination of “threat,” which is not really 
imminent, a dangerous precedent would be established. One of the great 
dilemmas in the enforcement of the right to preventive self-defense is linked 
to the difficulty in assessing proportionality, making it difficult to speculate 
on the appropriateness of the potential for action, especially in the light of the 
uncertainty of the threat to US security.  
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